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Most studies of the opening of the Chinese economy focus at the national level. The 
few existing disaggregated analyses are limited to analyzing changes in agricultural 
production. In this paper we employ an innovative village equilibrium model that accounts 
for nonseparability of household production and consumption decisions. This allows us to 
analyze the impact of trade liberalization on household production, consumption, and off-
farm employment, as well as the interactions among these three aspects of household 
decisions. The village model is used to analyze the impact of price changes and labor 
demand, the two major pathways through which international trade affects households. 
Analyzing the impact of trade liberalization for one village in the Jiangxi province of China 
we find changes in relative prices and outside village employment to have opposite impacts 
on household decisions. At the household level the impact of price changes dominates the 
employment impacts. Comparing full trade liberalization and the more limited Doha 
scenario, reactions are more modest in the latter case for most households, but the response is 
non-linear to increasing depth of trade reforms. This is explained by household-specific 
transaction (shadow) prices in combination with endogenous choices to participate in the 
output markets.  
 
Rising income inequalities are a growing concern in China. Whether trade 
liberalization allows incomes to grow together or to grow apart depends on whether one 
accounts for the reduction in aggregate consumption demand when household members 
migrate. Assessing the net effect on the within-village income distribution, we find that 
poorer households that own draught power gain most from trade liberalization. The 
households that have to rely on the utilization of own labor for farm activities and are not 
endowed with traction power, nor with a link to employment opportunities in the prospering 
coastal regions, have fewer opportunities for adjustment.   3
Introduction 
 
Gradual integration into the global economy, combined with far-reaching domestic 
reforms, has made China a showcase of attaining rapid economic growth through market-
based reforms. The rapid economic growth during the past decades, however, has been 
accompanied by an increasing disparity between coastal and interior regions and between 
rural and urban areas. The coastal cities benefited most from the increasing export 
opportunities, due to a combination of geographical factors and deliberate policies (Démurger 
et al., 2002).  
The extent of reforms in combination with the sheer size of the Chinese economy has 
resulted in a body of literature with a growth rate rivaling China’s GDP growth. Most studies 
of the opening of the Chinese economy to the rest of the world focus on the national level 
impacts. One exception is a study by Diao et al. (2003) on the regional impact of China’s 
recent WTO accession. As in other national level studies, they find a positive aggregate effect 
for China as a whole. This aggregate effect obscures differences across regions. Reflecting 
past trends of diverging growth between coastal and inland provinces (see for example 
Démurger et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2003), income gaps between provinces are found to 
widen following WTO accession. They also find rural-urban migration provides an important 
mechanism for transmitting urban growth to the rural areas. Especially central provinces 
bordering the booming coastal provinces (Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan) benefit from an 
increase in rural-urban migration. 
A second exception to the common use of a national level analysis is a study by 
Huang et al. (2003) analyzing the impact of WTO accession on farm households. They find 
that despite a small positive aggregate impact of the WTO, the distribution of benefits gives 
cause for concern. Households in richer coastal areas benefit most, having higher yielding 
lands and cultivating internationally competitive crops. Another interesting finding of their  4
household level analysis is an increase in aggregate agricultural production, despite a 
decrease in the agricultural price index. Farmers respond to the changes in relative prices 
induced by the WTO by shifting to more competitive activities (livestock, fish, vegetables 
and rice), resulting in a net increase in agricultural production.   
These two studies show that a disaggregated analysis of the impact of trade reform 
yields insights that diverge from insights gained at the national level. Our objective in this 
paper is to contribute a village-level perspective on trade reform in China. Adjustment 
responses of different household types and within-village interactions are central to this 
analysis. This study complements earlier studies by zooming in on the differential impact of 
trade liberalization on households within a village. A new methodology that accounts for 
family-farm production specifics in a village-economy setting gives us a unique perspective 
on the impact of trade reform. Going beyond the household level study of Huang et al. (2003) 
we account in addition for the impact of farm income on rural household consumption. We 
furthermore account for the impact of rural-urban migration, thus not limiting the analysis to 
developments in the agricultural sector. 
In this study we combine a macro level analysis of trade reform, with a village level 
general equilibrium model of a rice-producing village in Jiangxi Province. To be able to 
combine the macro and village level analysis of trade reform, we need to ascertain how trade 
reform affects households. Prices and labor demand form the key transmission mechanisms 
through which macro level trade reform affects rural households (Winters, 2002). We 
therefore focus on changes in prices for consumed goods, agricultural inputs and outputs, and 
on the increased demand for labor by labor-intensive sectors in which China has a 
comparative advantage. 
Our analysis of further trade reform builds on a baseline that encompasses China’s 
recent WTO accession, phasing out the export quota for textiles under the Agreement on  5
Textiles and Clothing. We draw on global results for an assessment of the macro-level 
impacts of further reform under a WTO–Doha round and feed these into the village-level 
model. Specifically, we simulate the impacts of the standard Doha scenario, as well as the 
Full-Lib scenario. In both cases we disentangle the effects of changing prices for inputs and 
outputs from the effects of increases in off-farm employment and wages. 
The full liberalization scenario provides a useful benchmark against which the less 
ambitious Doha scenario can be compared. Analyzing consumption we find that poorer 
households face a stronger rise in expenditures. This is due to a larger share of agricultural 
goods in their consumption and a shift from being net-sellers to self-sufficiency in the case of 
some households. 
Analyzing the impact of changing agricultural input and output prices (with 
unchanging employment and wages), we find an increased village supply of rice and other 
livestock, which corresponds with the findings of national level studies and with the results of 
the farm household analysis in Huang et al. (2003). This increased supply of rice, however, is 
the net result of three household groups increasing rice production, and one group reducing 
rice production.  
The net impact of more off-farm employment (at constant prices) following global 
trade reform is a decrease in rice supply, caused by an increasing scarcity of labor. Again we 
find divergent household responses, with some households increasing rice production due to 
lower costs of animal traction rented within the village. Since this is opposite in sign to the 
impact of higher prices, it is interesting to ask which dominates. We find that the impact of 
price changes dominates the impact of increased employment. 
 A more modest liberalization within the context of the Doha round has a similar, but 
less pronounced, impact as observed under full trade liberalization. The notable exception is  6
the village rice economy. Under our full liberalization scenario rice production becomes more 
intensive in land and labor, and village marketed surplus increases.  
 
1.   A Household Perspective on General Equilibrium Modeling 
A disaggregated perspective can lead to new insights in the impact of trade reform. 
Separating farm production decisions from household consumption decisions is standard 
practice in general equilibrium models, both macro as well as existing village general 
equilibrium models. Ignoring the interdependency of household production and consumption 
decisions, however, can be misleading when market imperfections render these two aspects 
of household decisions nonseparable.  
Nonseparability of household production and consumption decisions occurs when the 
effective price of a commodity used both in production and consumption is not exogenous to 
the household, but is determined endogenously by household demand and supply. In this 
case, production decisions will affect supply of the commodity, which affects its shadow 
price and hence consumption decisions, and vice versa. Such nonseparability occurs if 
households are not price-takers in a market, if markets are missing, or if there is a gap 
between buying and selling prices (Löfgren and Robinson, 1999). The seminal work of De 
Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) shows how rational behavior of farmers in 
combination with market failures may give rise to sluggish or counterintuitive household 
responses. 
There are a number of points that are essential to farm household modeling. First, 
standard economic rules for production and consumption remain valid. Differences with a 
separate analysis of production and consumption decisions occur because of endogenous 
prices, not because of different behavior by the household. Consequently standard approaches 
to modeling production and consumption decisions can be followed. But endogenous  7
household prices complicate empirical work. The endogenous household shadow prices are 
an analytical construct and thus cannot be directly observed. This complicates the estimation 
of demand and supply functions for nonseparable household models.  
Second, household models tend to generate ambiguous results and quickly become 
analytically intractable. Ambiguous results may already occur with perfect markets. Assume 
that prices for food increase. This will increase food production and thus household income. 
The higher income prompts an increase in consumption, which may outweigh the increase in 
food production, depending on the preferences of the household. The food price increase then 
does not lead to an unequivocal increase in marketed surplus. In fact, if the income effect is 
strong enough, sales by the household will actually fall. Thus, in those cases where an 
analytical solution of the household model can be obtained, it will generally be difficult to 
sign the effects because of counteracting effects on the production and consumption sides of 
the household. Models with multiple missing markets complicate things even more.  
A third point about household modeling is the importance of accounting for different 
levels of market integration of households from a policy perspective, as can be illustrated 
with a price band model (Figure 1). Starting from an exogenous market price, transaction 
costs increase the effective purchase price, and decrease the effective sales price faced by the 
household. Household demand and supply then determine the household-specific shadow 
price of the commodity, with effective purchase and sales prices forming upper and lower 
boundaries. Figure 1 shows the supply curve for three different types of households. 
Depending on the intersection of the demand and supply curve, a household is (1) a net 
buyer, (2) self-sufficient, (3) a net seller of the commodity. If the household is a net buyer or 
seller, the household shadow price equals the effective purchase or sales price. If the 
household is self-sufficient (case 2), the household shadow price is endogenously determined 
within the price band and decisions become nonseparable. A missing market can be  8
conceptualized in this model as a wide price band (in the most extreme case, a sales price of 
zero and an infinite purchase price), such that all households always operate within it. 
Household response then consists of two decisions, (i) a discrete decision on market-
position, determining their position as net buyer, net seller or not participating; (ii) a 
continuous decision on production and consumption levels, determining supply response. The 
position of the household in the market determines the effective decision-making prices for 
the second decision. Net buyers will respond differently to a price increase than net sellers, 
while households operating within their price band will not show any response to the price 
change. The position of the household in the market, thus has an important impact on the 
household response to price incentives.  
Nonseparability has become an important feature of household models, but is absent 
in applied general equilibrium models. A study by Löfgren and Robinson (1999) provides a 
stylized application of including farm-household models in a general equilibrium model, but 
this approach has not previously been implemented in an empirical analysis. 
Given the recent transformations in China, markets are still developing and 
imperfections can be expected to be abound. Studies of factors influencing migration 
decisions (Hare, 1999; Murphy, 2000; Rozelle et al., 1999a; Rozelle et al., 1999b) and of 
patterns in inequality (Benjamin and Brandt, 1999), refer to imperfect land, labor and credit 
markets as being relevant in the Chinese context. Such a partial integration in markets may 
give rise to nonseparability of household decisions, or may create (thin) local markets 
through which household decisions affect each other. 
If households interact with each other in local village markets, and these markets are 
not integrated with markets outside of the village, local general equilibrium effects occur. 
Studies of market integration in China find villages to be integrated in markets for major 
outputs (Huang et al., 2003) and for fertilizer (Qiao et al., 2003). While villages may thus be  9
assumed to be integrated in agricultural input and output markets, integration of factor 
markets is still limited. Labor markets are highly segmented (Gilbert and Wahl, 2003), 
resulting in a rural labor surplus (Cook, 1999), which is only partly absorbed in Township-
Village Enterprises The local village labor markets are limited in rural areas, including the 
labor market in our case study village in Jiangxi province. A prime reason for limited 
development of a rural labor market is the collective ownership of land, which grants all 
households access to land. Consequently, there are no landless households that would 
specialize in wage earning activities, and hence little scope for local labor markets.  
In spite of land tenure reforms that have granted household user rights for 30 years, 
and recently were changed to permit inheritance, land rights remain ambiguous (Huang and 
Rozelle, 2004). Land is allocated on the basis of demographic criteria, and readjustments 
occur to adjust for changes in household size, despite formal household user rights. The result 
is an ambiguous land tenure situation (Ho, 2001) in which households have an incentive to 
keep their land cultivated to avoid losing it during the next readjustment. Households that 
migrate to urban areas rent their land to other local households, seeking to maintain their 
claim to the land in case they are unable to secure a living in the urban areas. Given the 
ambiguity of land tenure, land rental markets are inherently local in nature. 
Village interactions may also arise through informal credit markets. Government 
intervention in the formal banking sector remains strong. Regulated interest rates are well-
below market clearing levels, while soft loans to state enterprises seize a large share of 
available funds. Rural households are thus rationed out of credit markets. In the late 1980s, 
rural cooperative funds developed, targeted at rural households. These funds proved to be too 
successful competitors for existing rural credit cooperatives and were dissolved in 1999 (Park 
et al., 2003). As a result of the lack of formal credit options, household have to rely on local 
informal credit markets. In this study we therefore use a village level general equilibrium  10
model to account for the interactions among households in the local markets for land and 
capital, while paying due attention to nonseparability of household decisions flowing from 
the presence of significant transactions costs. 
Taylor and Adelman (1996) pioneered the use of general equilibrium models at the 
village level. Their model closely follows the structure of macro level models, for example by 
modeling production at the sector level, which misses the impact of nonseparability of 
household decisions. We take a different approach to village modeling, placing differences in 
household response due to nonseparability at the center of the model. This household 
perspective on general equilibrium modeling results in a different model structure than used 
in macro level general equilibrium models and in existing village level models. We model 
production activities as being household-specific. This allows for idiosyncratic household 
responses consistent with nonseparability of production and consumption decisions. A second 
major difference is the nesting structure used for modeling production decisions. For each 
activity the production structure is calibrated based on the household survey data
1. As a result 
we have household specific production functions, capturing differences in household access 
to inputs
2.  
By placing households at the center of the model, the village model used in this study 
is able to capture differences in production decisions reflecting differences in access to 
inputs, interactions between household production and consumption decisions, and 
interactions among different households within a village economy. 
 
                                                 
1  Our estimation also rejected the commonly assumed separability of factors and intermediate inputs, and this 
assumption was therefore dropped in the village equilibrium model. 
2  Detailed description of the village equilibrium model and calibration procedures can be obtained from the 
authors.  11
2.   Models and Data 
2.1   Linking macro results to the village model 
We analyze the village-level impact of two liberalization scenarios: full trade 
liberalization, as well as a Doha round scenario. Since we do not model the Chinese economy 
at the national level, the GTAP results include China’s tariff cuts as well as liberalization in 
the rest of the world.  
To link the macro-shocks for China to the village model, we follow the conceptual 
framework of Winters (2002), and focus on prices and labor demand. Studies of market 
integration of three main staple crops and fertilizer (Huang et al., 2003; Qiao et al., 2003) 
show integrated regional and national markets, with village level prices responding to 
changes at the national level. These integrated commodity markets allow us to directly 
translate relative price changes derived from the macro level analysis to the village level.  
In addition to the transmission of price changes, we analyze the impact of changes in 
employment opportunities. Studies of trade liberalization find an expansion of labor-intensive 
sectors in which China has a comparative advantage. We thus need to link aggregate 
expansion of employment to village level changes in temporary migration to urban areas. 
Lacking data to quantify the link between national level changes in employment and 
household decisions, we assume percentage changes in aggregate labor demand to be 
completely transmitted to the village. Percentage changes in outside village employment are 
thus set equal to changes in aggregate labor demand. Such a one-on-one relation between 
national level employment and off-farm activities of the households in the case study village 
seems justified given the findings in Diao et al. (2003). Comparing the change in rural-urban 
migration across regions following WTO accession, they find the fastest increase in rural-
urban migration in the central provinces. The case study village is located in Jiangxi, one of  12
these central provinces, and migration outside of the province plays an important role in the 
village economy, justifying the assumption of a complete transmission of the demand for 
labor to the village level (the case study village is more thoroughly described below). 
Similarly, changes in outside-village wages and changes non-agricultural wages are 
taken from the GTAP simulations. As will be seen below, the rural-urban wage differential is 
endogenously determined through modeling of household-specific shadow wages. Mapping 
macro-level changes computed with the GTAP model to the village level results in the shocks 
summarized in Table 1. 
2.2   The case study village  
The case-study village has been selected to be representative of rice producing 
villages in the plains area of Jiangxi Province, one of the poorer provinces in China. Data on 
production and consumption of 168 households were collected for 2000, using standard 
household questionnaires with questions on source and destination of commodities added to 
allow construction of a village SAM. These surveyed households account for about a quarter 
of the village population, totaling 729 households.  
Differences among households are at the center of our village equilibrium model. 
Four groups of households are distinguished, using ownership of draught power (cattle or 
tractor) and access to extra-province employment as grouping criteria. The resulting groups 
represent households with differential capacity for earning a living from agriculture and from 
(transitory) migration to coastal cities. 
The upper part of Table 2 presents the activities of each household type in terms of 
contribution to value-added. Taking the first column for the unlinked households with no 
draught power, we observe that crops are the dominant source of farm value added. One-
season rice contributes 9.4 percent to value added, while the more intensive two-season rice 
contributes as much as 28.5 percent. Other crops, such as vegetables, contribute another 21.2  13
percent to household value added. The share of livestock is rather limited, with pigs and other 
livestock each contributing 0.1 percent. For this household group the total contribution of 
agricultural activities to value added is 59.2 percent, while the remainder is coming from 
engaging in off-farm activities. Hiring out its labor to other villagers contributes 1.3 percent 
to value added, while working in local businesses earns 19.4 percent of value added. Outside 
village employment is a significant income source for this household group, with a share of 
18.1 percent. For this unlinked household, migration opportunities are restricted to moving 
inside the province, which contributes 1.8 percent of value added.  
For all household types off-farm employment contributes a significant share of 
income, but there exist important differences in the nature of non-agricultural income 
sources. Comparing the two household groups that have no link outside the province, we find 
that households lacking draught power are oriented more towards local off-farm employment. 
The households with draught power obtain 71.4 percent of value-added from agriculture, 
which is similar to the importance of agriculture for the other household group owning 
draught power. The household group with access to migration but lacking draught power 
derives about 40 percent of value-added from outside province migration, and only derives 
about 45 percent of value-added from agricultural activities. Differential access to 
agricultural and migration opportunities is thus reflected in the composition of household 
value-added.  
Differences in activities result in differences in income patterns across the four 
household groups. The bottom part of Table 2 presents income per adult consumer 
equivalent
3 to allow a direct comparison across households. As a crude poverty assessment 
                                                 
3 Adult equivalent instead of per capita consumption is used to account for differences in consumption between 
males and females and between age groups. Lacking survey data, conversion factors were taken from detailed 
consumption data of a study in Bangladesh (Zeller et al., 2001). In addition to differences in age and gender, 
consumer equivalents were corrected for the length of absence of household members due to temporary 
migration.  14
for each household group available income is computed in terms of dollars per day. Three of 
the household groups fall in between the one and two dollar per day poverty lines. The 
notable exception is the household group with an outside link and lacking draught power with 
just over two dollars per day. This is in line with the rural-urban income differences since this 
household group specializes in outside province migration.  
To get a clear view of differences in household endowments that affect household 
response, the middle part of Table 2 details income sources. Specific features of the village 
SAM and equilibrium model arise in this table. For example, income from labor and irrigated 
land is split between shadow income
4 and above shadow income. The household survey data 
reveal imperfect labor and land markets. Households are involved in a variety of off-farm 
activities with different wages. These wages are well above the estimated shadow wage, 
indicating restricted access to off-farm employment and suggesting a situation of labor 
surplus at the local level. This is not unexpected, given the high population density in rural 
China and similar findings in a study by Bowlus (2003).  
In the SAM and village equilibrium model the demand-constrained labor market is 
accounted for by valuing labor against household-specific shadow wages, estimated using the 
household survey data. In case of off-farm activities, labor then earns revenue above the 
shadow wage which is tracked in a separate account of the SAM. For example, for the 
unlinked households with no draught power labor is the most important endowment, 
contributing 74.9 percent to its income, broken down into 57.4 percent coming from shadow 
wages and 17.5 percent from above shadow wages.  
                                                 
4  Nonseparability results in household-specific shadow prices that balance households’ unobservable demand 
and supply. We therefore estimated an agricultural production function, explaining the total value of 
household output in terms labor-, land-, manure-, feed- and external inputs. The shadow prices are derived 
from this estimated production function as the marginal value product of each input. Specifically, for each 
household in the sample the household-specific shadow prices for household non-tradables are derived as the 
marginal value product of each input. Averaging over the households within a household group yields a  15
Although there is a rental market of sorts for irrigated land (paddy fields), the village 
model does not include a land market. When analyzing the village trade in land we found all 
four households groups to be net renters of land. This is due to a bias in the surveyed sample 
of households, which excludes households that have migrated from the village. These 
households are renting out land for a price below the productive value of the land. This 
difference can be interpreted as an insurance premium the households are willing to pay in 
order to maintain access to their land, which is collectively owned, in case they need to return 
to the village. The households remaining in the village thus get an indirect transfer of money 
from the migration of entire households, through having to pay less than the productive value 
for land rented in. Analysis of the migration of entire households is beyond the scope of our 
model. We therefore fix the supply of land at the level observed in the SAM, effectively 
removing the land market from the model. Taking again the example of the unlinked 
households with no draught power, the return earned on irrigated land endowment contributes 
17.2 percent to its income, broken down into a shadow rent component of 12.4 percent and 
the above shadow rent component of 4.8 percent. This above shadow rental income results 
from renting-in land at a price below its marginal production value from migrant households. 
Non-irrigated land contributes another 7.3 percent to the household income.  
A last remark on the village SAM pertains to the lack of data for modeling capital 
flows in the village. The SAM shows that the household group most involved in migration is 
a net supplier of capital to the other three groups of households. Although the survey contains 
some data on the conditions such funds are loaned, insufficient information is available to 
model a village-level capital market. We therefore assume that the household group lacking 
draught power but having an outside link spends a fixed share of its income on within-village 
                                                                                                                                                        
shadow price for each household nontradable and each household group. These shadow prices are used in 
constructing the SAM and in calibrating the village equilibrium model.  16
transfers. These transfers are allocated to the three household groups based on their share of 
transfers in the SAM. The model thus includes a rather simple mechanism through which the 
income from migration is transmitted through village linkages. 
   To summarize the discussion so far, we are analyzing the response of four different 
types of households, distinguished on the basis of their access to agricultural income and 
income from outside province migration. Analyzing sources of income pointed to imperfect 
labor and land markets. These are accommodated by estimating household-specific shadow 
prices, introducing profits earned on off-farm employment and renting of land, and by 
modeling household production and consumption decisions as nonseparable.  
2.3   The village equilibrium model 
Despite introducing nonseparability of household production and consumption 
decisions, the mathematical structure of the model closely resembles macro level general 
equilibrium models. Consumption decisions are modeled through a linear expenditure 
system, while production is modeled by nested CES functions. Table 3 summarizes the key 
substitution elasticities for each activity. The estimation procedure for obtaining these 
substitution elasticities exploits the inter-household variation in the survey data. The nesting 
structure differs across activities and is determined by statistical testing based on pairwise 
comparisons. Kuiper (2005) provides full details of this method.  
The village model does not attempt to treat two-way flows of commodity trade with 
the outside world. Households consume farm output, but do not purchase these goods from 
outside the village, nor from other households in the village. Household sales to outside 
village markets are thus equal to total production minus household consumption. 
Village markets exist for traction by draught animals or tractors, and for locally 
produced consumption goods. Of these village markets, only animal traction has an 
endogenous village price in the model. The SAM indicates that only limited use is made of  17
the tractors. This under-utilization of available tractors is therefore modeled through fixed 
prices for tractor services, the volume of which adjusts endogenously to demand.  
Off-farm employment options were found to be restricted, resulting in wages 
exceeding the shadow price of labor. This is handled in the village equilibrium model by 
fixing the levels of outside village employment and having households earn a profit above 
labor costs on off-farm activities. Levels of village employment (agricultural and 
nonagricultural) cannot be fixed, although for these activities wages also exceed shadow 
wages. Agricultural employment is therefore assumed to be demand-driven, with prices being 
exogenously fixed
5. Demand for non-agricultural labor in the village economy is linked to 
local business activities, to which we now turn.  
Due to lack of data on other inputs, local business activities use only labor (village 
non-agricultural labor), yielding a return that exceeds the shadow wage. All households are 
involved in local business activities and all of them purchase locally produced goods. This 
reflects a heterogeneity in goods not captured by the aggregates used in the SAM and village 
model. Because of a lack of data, we fix village prices of local goods to deal with the gap 
between product prices and costs of labor. Assuming fixed prices seems justified, since prices 
of village produced goods are common knowledge, while shadow wages cannot be observed. 
Given the unobservable character of shadow wages, it seems unlikely that a change in labor 
costs will be reflected by a change in the village price. A second reason for fixing prices of 
local business activities is the absence of a peak season. Production can therefore be shifted 
to times when little labor is needed in agriculture, limiting the need to increase the price when 
shadow wages increase. 
                                                 
5 Agricultural wages are in excess of shadow wages. Households are therefore always willing to supply 
additional agricultural labor when it is demanded.   18
For all demand-driven activities (local consumption goods, hired agricultural labor, 
tractor services), market equilibrium is established by allocating demand to suppliers based 
on the initial market shares recorded in the SAM. 
Finally, all surveyed households are net sellers of agricultural production, i.e. they 
begin in regime 3 of Figure 1. The simulations may result in a regime change for households, 
possibly turning some household groups into net buyers. Lacking observations from the 
survey we use an estimate of transaction costs for rice from Park et al. (2002) to set the width 
of the price-band at 25 percent of the selling price. Thus households will become net buyers 
if their shadow price rises 25 percent above the initial selling price. 
Summarizing, the village equilibrium model resembles commonly used macro level 
general equilibrium models in the way in which consumption and production are modeled. A 
major difference with macro and existing village level models is household-specific 
production, which is affected by household consumption decisions through endogenous 
household shadow prices. Lack of data resulted in most village markets to be modeled as 
fixed price, demand-driven equilibria. The only exception is the village market for animal 
traction, which is balanced through an endogenous village price. Household production and 
consumption decisions are calibrated on the household survey data, resulting in household-
specific demand and supply functions.  
 
3.   Full Liberalization Impacts 
There are two major pathways through which trade liberalization affects households: 
changes in prices of consumed goods, agricultural inputs and outputs and changes in off-farm 
employment and wages. In this section we first analyze each of these two pathways 
separately before looking at the combined impact of the full liberalization scenario. 
   19
3.1   The impact of price changes with full liberalization 
We focus the discussion of price changes on the changes in production. Prices of 
consumption goods increase as the demand for China’s products overseas increases strongly 
and she experiences a real appreciation. The price increases in agricultural output, however, 
outstrip the increased cost of consumption. More importantly, whereas households have 
limited opportunities to change their consumption patterns, they have much more flexibility 
in changing their mix of production.  
  With full liberalization all household groups increase other livestock production, 
while three out of four intensify rice production and shift towards two-season rice (Table 4). 
There are two forces that account for these shifts in production. First of all, due to the 
absence of a credit market, livestock production is cash-constrained. The rise in output prices 
increases the availability of cash for all households, resulting in an expansion of previously 
constrained livestock production. The switch to other livestock instead of pigs is due to 
differences in input use. Pig production uses purchased feed, which experiences a strong 
price increase of 4.1 percent, while external inputs used in other livestock increase with only 
0.4 percent which is well below the rise in output prices. 
The second driving force behind the shift in production patterns is the increase in rice 
prices, making more intensive rice production attractive. Rice production can be intensified 
by switching from one-season to two-season rice, thus doubling the use of the available 
irrigated land. Having two cropping seasons strongly increases the demand for labor, which 
explains the opposite production response of the household group with draught power, but 
lacking an outside link. This household starts to rent out draught power and invests the 
proceeds in intensive (other) livestock production, and it reallocates labor from two-season 
rice production towards intensive livestock. It ceases to be a seller of two-season rice and of 
pigs, moving into regime 2 in Figure 1. It almost becomes a buyer of pigs, with its household- 20
specific price for pigs rising by 21 percent, but this price rise falls just within the 25 percent 
price band, and hence it does not yet become a buyer. Similarly, the fourth household in 
Table 4 ceases to sell one-season rice. 
 Summarizing, changes in agricultural input and output prices increase the availability 
of cash allowing an expansion of previously constrained livestock production. It furthermore 
leads to an intensification of rice production for those household groups that have sufficient 
labor resources.  
3.2 The household as a supplier of labor: the impact of increasing off-
farm employment 
Off-farm employment is an important source of income. For the village as a whole 41 
percent of income is generated from off-farm sources, both inside the village in local business 
activities, as outside the village and even from employment outside the province. For the 
household lacking draught power but having an outside link, for example, migration accounts 
for close to 40 percent of value-added. An increase in off-farm employment opportunities is 
simulated in scenario Full Liberalization B, through rising wages and increased employment 
demand. To clarify the impact of this second pathway through which trade liberalization 
affects households, we now abstract from the price changes of inputs and outputs associated 
with full liberalization.  
Per capita consumption is of course increased by the additional income. This holds 
especially for the households involved in migration, since the number of household members 
present in the village decreases. This leaves more income for the remaining household 
members.  
Increased off-farm employment decreases the available agricultural labor force, which 
leads to less labor-intensive agricultural production for three of the household groups,  21
resulting in a slight decrease of two-season rice and a marked increase of other livestock 
production (Table 5). The driving force behind this response is the village market for animal 
draught services. With ‘linked’ households moving to one-season rice, demand for animal 
traction is reduced and its price falls. This means that the renting-in of draught power 
becomes cheaper for the household group with no animal traction and no outside 
employment.  
The third household receives about 40 percent of its income from migrant labor. It 
responds to the employment opportunities generated by full liberalization by shifting 
resources out of agriculture, and concentrating more on off-farm employment. It does, 
however, keep some rice production and pigs. Pig production uses less labor than other 
livestock, and is thus a more attractive option with increasing shadow wages resulting from a 
rise in off-farm employment.  
The driving forces behind the diverging response of the fourth household group, those 
owning draught power and having a link outside the province, are endowments of labor and 
access to migration. The access to migration outside the province provides an important 
source of cash, just as it does for the other household group with an outside link. The fourth 
household, however, has the largest labor endowment of all households, and this tempers the 
rise in its shadow wages. As a result, the labor and cash-intensive other livestock production 
is more attractive than pig production for this one household group. 
Interestingly the second household, with no outside link but with ownership of 
draught power, chooses to stop selling other livestock. Its shadow price of other livestock 
rises just above the market price and it becomes more attractive to use the output for own 
consumption.  
Summarizing the results in this section, we find that an increase in off-farm 
employment reduces the agricultural labor force. While the wage hike encourages a switch  22
towards less-labor intensive pig production on the part of some households, the village as a 
whole shows little change in pig production, but a large increase in other livestock 
production. 
3.3   Combining price and employment effects 
The above discussion shows that price effects of liberalization may move opposite to 
the effects of improved off-farm employment opportunities, depending on the initial 
household endowments and on their links with the economy outside the village. The 
combined effect is summarized in Table 6.  
At the village level, price and employment changes have an opposite impact on rice 
and pigs exported from the village. Where rising output prices promote rice and other 
livestock production, increasing off-farm employment opportunities tends to reduce the 
marketed surplus of labor intensive agricultural output. When these two elements of the Full-
Lib scenario are combined, the price effects dominate and the result is a more labor intensive 
package of outputs. The net effect is a marked 37 percent rise of village marketed surplus, 
mainly driven by expansion of other livestock. To put this huge increase in perspective, we 
have to be aware that the contribution of this commodity to the village’s marketed surplus is 
just two percent in the base, whereas it becomes 29 percent in the wake of full liberalization. 
The other important surplus commodity is two-season rice, which contributes 62 percent of 
the village marketed surplus in the base, and still accounts for 50 percent in the Full-Lib 
scenario.  
 
4.   Doha Impacts 
Having established the maximum potential impacts of trade reform on this village 
economy, we now turn to the Doha scenario. The second set of bars in Figure 2 summarizes  23
production responses at the village level. For pig production and other livestock the Doha 
scenarios produce a less pronounced response than the full liberalization scenario. This is to 
be expected, since the exogenous price shocks are smaller under Doha. But in both cases pig 
production decreases and other livestock increases remarkably (note that we express changes 
in other livestock in per 1000 instead of per cent for expositional clarity). 
  For rice production a more interesting aggregate response emerges. Under our full 
liberalization scenario rice production becomes more labor and land-intensive, with an 
increase in two-season rice and a decrease in one-season rice. This is due to the combined 
effect of households three and four moving into more intensive rice production in response to 
rising prices (Table 6), while household two specializes in renting out traction power and 
consequently has to switch to less intensive own rice production.  
  Under the Doha scenario, however, we see a de-intensification of rice production in 
the village and a drop in aggregate rice output. Rice prices do not increase enough and 
shadow wages do not rise enough to induce the ‘linked’ households to specialize in more 
labor intensive forms of farming. For these ‘linked’ households, economic developments 
outside the village are paramount. Those ‘linked’ households without draught power are most 
engaged in outside province migration and are able to realize substantial gains already from 
the more modest Doha scenarios by seizing the improved employment opportunities. 
 
5.   Impacts on Inequality 
Growing income inequalities are now at the top of the policy agenda in China. The 
rural-urban income inequalities are transmitted to the village by asymmetric access to 
migration. The household group with the strongest involvement in migration also has the 
highest income per adult equivalent (see Table 2). The increase in employment following 
trade liberalization may therefore be expected to increase within-village income inequality.  24
The impact of an increase in agricultural output prices, on the other hand, may be expected to 
benefit the households owning draught power but lacking an outside link, since the activities 
of this household group are concentrated in agriculture.  
Table 7 summarizes income effects in terms of equivalent variation per adult 
equivalent. The simulated income gains are substantial, with an average increase of income 
over base levels as high as 21 percent under the full liberalization experiment. Under the 
Doha scenario, the income gains are reduced to about five percent, due to the smaller price 
changes.  
In both cases, above average gains from price effects are observed for the household 
without an outside link and owning draught power. Under full liberalization this household 
group gains 725 yuan per adult equivalent, or 33 percent of its base level income per adult 
equivalent. Ownership of capital in the form of draught power is decisive for the relative size 
of the gains.  
Most gains from increased employment opportunities fall on the households engaged 
in outside employment and not owning draught power. Under full liberalization this amounts 
to 123 yuan, or four percent of its base household income under full liberalization. 
Employment contributes 38 percent of the total gains under this scenario, while price changes 
contribute 62 percent (Table 8). Under the more modest Doha scenarios, with limited price 
changes, the employment component contributes as much as 70 percent of the gains for this 
household group. In general terms, outside village employment effects following trade 
liberalization indeed increase income inequality within the village, but the welfare gains from 
employment are substantially smaller than the gains from prices changes. Combining both 
effects, we note that the rising income inequality may be compensated by gains from 
specialization for those who stay behind. The net effect on the within-village income 
distribution is determined by the interplay of initial endowments, village markets for inputs  25
and outputs and by market imperfections. As a result, it appears that even poorer households 
begin to catch up. The households that have to rely on the utilization of own labor on the 
household farm and are not endowed with traction power nor with a link to employment 
opportunities in the prospering coastal regions have fewer opportunities for adjustment. In 
fact the only option for them is to farm rice more intensively and to shift into the labor 
intensive other livestock production.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we employed an innovative village equilibrium model, which fully 
accounts for nonseparability of household production and consumption response. This 
allowed us to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on agricultural supply response and 
off-farm employment, while simultaneously accounting for household consumption 
decisions. The village model is used to analyze the impact of trade liberalization, which was 
quantified through macro level shocks to the Chinese economy obtained from GTAP model 
simulations. We analyzed the impact of price changes and labor demand, the two major 
pathways through which international trade affects households.  
Our full liberalization benchmark shows results that are well in line with the findings 
of national level studies and with the results of the household analysis in Huang et al. (2003). 
Analyzing the impact of changes in agricultural input and output prices, we find an increased 
village supply of rice and other livestock. As the cash constraint is lifted in the wake of rising 
incomes following liberalization, the households invest the proceeds in the capital intensive 
activity of livestock production. The increased supply of rice is the result of more complex 
interactions, however, as some household groups increase rice production, while others 
reduce rice production.   26
Apart from influencing agricultural input and output prices, trade liberalization 
increases off-farm employment opportunities. The net impact of more off-farm employment 
is a decrease in rice supply, caused by an increasing scarcity of labor. Again we find 
diverging household response, with some households increasing rice production due to lower 
costs of animal traction rented within the village.  
Employment and migration leads to less intensive rice production and a drop in 
village marketed surplus. Combined with the price effects from full liberalization, we observe 
increases in rice surplus. This is quite interesting, as one household specializes in renting out 
traction services to the households engaged in migrant employment, and decreases its own 
rice production. In terms of the village supply response, the impact of the change in prices 
thus dominate the impact of increased employment.  
The two pathways through which trade affects households thus have an opposite 
impact on household production response. Assessing the combined effect at the household 
level, the dominant aspect of trade liberalization depends on household endowments and 
production activities. We observe changes in intra-village specialization, depending on the 
households’ endowments and the strength of their linkages with the outside economy. We 
furthermore found that a strong involvement in off-farm employment does not necessarily 
imply that the employment aspect of trade liberalization dominates household response, 
thereby hampering ex ante judgments about the most relevant aspect of trade liberalization 
for a specific household type.  
A more modest liberalization within the context of the Doha round has a different 
impact on the village rice economy from full trade liberalization. The reason for this non-
linear response to increasing depth of trade reforms lies in the household-specific transaction 
(shadow) prices in combination with endogenous choices to participate in the output markets. 
Taking transaction costs into account, some households choose to withdraw from the market  27
if their own shadow price is greater than the market price. Clearly, a partial reform scenario, 
such as Doha, leads to less pronounced output price changes than full liberalization.  
Under the Doha scenario, average income gains amount to about five percent, while 
under full liberalization the gains are four times as high. However, the impacts vary by 
household type and the question arises whether such changes will reduce or exacerbate 
existing inequalities in China. Whether trade liberalization allows incomes to grow together 
or to grow apart depends on whether one accounts for the reduction in consumption demand 
when household members migrate. Assessing the net effect on the within-village income 
distribution, we find that even poorer households are able to catch up. The households that 
have to rely on the utilization of own labor on the household farm and are not endowed with 
traction power nor with a link to employment opportunities in the prospering coastal regions 
have less opportunities for gains. Thus although rural-urban migration can transfer benefits 
from economic growth in the coastal provinces to inland provinces, asymmetric access to 
migration implies that the rising rural-urban income differences are transferred as well.  28
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Agricultural outputs     
One-season rice  7.4  -  1.3  - 
Two-season rice  7.4  -  1.3  - 
Other crops  4.1  -  1.1  - 
Pigs 5.0  -  1.3  - 
Other livestock  5.0  -  1.3  - 
Agricultural inputs       
Fertilizer 0.6  -  0.2  - 
Herbicides 0.6  -  0.2  - 
Pesticides 0.6  -  0.2  - 
Seed 5.1  -  1.3  - 
Purchased feed  5.1  -  1.3  - 
Other inputs  0.9  -  0.3  - 
Consumption goods       
Food 3.3  -  0.9  - 
Processed food  3.3  -  0.9  - 
Nonfood 1.8  -  0.6  - 
Durables 0.0  -  0.0  - 
Other expenditures  1.8  -  0.6  - 
       
Wages       
Non-agricultural employment  -  2.2  -  0.7 
Migration, inside province  -  2.2  -  0.7 
Migration, outside province  -  0.6  -  0.3 
Outside village employment        
Non-agricultural employment  -  1.8  -  1.5 
Migration, inside province  -  1.8  -  1.5 
Migration, outside province  -  2.2  - 1.9 
Note: complete liberalization applies a combined shock of prices and employment (i.e. 








Table 2: Activities and income by household group 
Link outside province: No link   Link  
Owning draught power: No  Yes    No Yes   
Village 
N= 78 100    256 295    729 
Composition of activities (% value added)          
Agriculture  One-season rice  9.4 10.8  8.2  10.5  9.5 
 Two-season rice  28.5 28.2  18.6  27.1  23.9 
 Other crops  21.2 24.7  18.4  22.4  20.9 
 Cattle -  7.5  -  8.1  4.1 
 Pigs 0.1 0.1  0.2  0.4  0.3 
 Other livestock  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Village employment  Agricultural labor  1.3 2.2  -  0.1  0.4 
 Local business  19.4 13.5  2.4  2.7  5.2 
Outside village  Outside employment  18.0 12.9  9.1  5.4  8.9 
Migration  Inside province   2.1 -  4.2  0.9  2.3 
  Outside province   -  -  38.8  22.3  24.6 
   100  100 100  100 100 
           
Sources of household income (% total income)          
Labor  Shadow wage income  57.4 52.8   52.6 62.1     57.4
 Above shadow wage income  17.5 12.3 23.3 6.0    13.5
Land  Irrigated land shadow income  12.4 13.3 12.8 11.4    12.1
 Irrigated land, above shadow income 4.8 6.5 1.4 4.5    3.7
 Non-irrigated land  7.3 7.9 7.7 6.6    7.2
Capital  Cattle - 3.3 -3 . 1     1.8
  Tractor - 1.6 -0 . 8     0.6
Transfer  Within village transfers  0.6 0.3 0.0
1 0.5    0.3
  Receipts from outside village  0.0 1.9   2.2 5.0     3.3
   100  100 100  100 100 
           
Income per adult consumer equivalent          
Annual income in 1,000 yuan  2.2 2.3   3.0 2.7     2.7
Income in US dollar per day  1.5 1.6 2.1 1.9    1.8





Table 3a: Substitution elasticities for cropping activities (village average) 




One-season rice          
Labor  0.39        
Animal traction  0.39 1.87      
Tractor  0.39 1.87  79.21     
Other inputs  1.72 2.09  2.09  2.09  1.84 
          
Two-season rice          
Labor  0.66        
Animal traction  0.66 0.66      
Tractor  0.66 0.66  53.65     
Other inputs  0.98 0.98  0.98  0.98  1.35 
          
Other crops          
Labor  0.33        
Animal traction  0.33 2.88      
Tractor  - -  -     
Other inputs  0.57 1.41  1.41  -  1.06 
Note: elasticities as well as the structure of the production functions are calibrated with the survey data, for details see 
Kuiper (2005); because of differences in cost shares, substitution elasticities vary slightly household group. 
  
 
Table 3b: Substitution elasticities for livestock activities (village average) 
 Labor  Crop  residues  Purchased 
feed 
Pigs     
Crop residues  1.53    
Purchased feed  1.53 1.53   
Other inputs  1.53 1.53 1.49 
      
Other livestock     
Crop residues  0.87    
Purchased feed  0.87 0.87   
Other inputs  0.87 0.87 0.87 
Note: elasticities as well as the structure of the production functions are calibrated with the survey 
data, for details see Kuiper (2005); because of differences in cost shares, substitution elasticities vary 
slightly household group.  35
Table 4: Household production and marketed surplus with Full Liberalization scenario A
1/  
(% change) 
Link outside province:  No link   Link   Village 
Owning draught power:  No  Yes    No Yes     
Production:            
Crops  One season rice  -18.8  90.3 -46.6  -67.4  -31.8 
 Two season rice  8.5  -32.5  23.6  32.7  17.3 
  Other crops  -1.1  -1.9  0.0  -1.7  -1.1 
Livestock  Pig production  -31.1  -83.8 -5.2  -24.6  -22.9 
 Other livestock  432.1  3093.4  56.5  367.6  650.0 
          
Marketed surplus:         
Crops  One season rice  -39.5  125.6  -90.6  -100.0  -52.4 
 Two season rice  19.4  -100.0  68.0  91.7  45.4 
  Other crops  -72.7  -36.4 0.4  -23.0  -16.1 
Livestock  Pig production  -32.9  -100.0  -5.8  -38.6  -27.9 
 Other livestock  946.4  6539.5  207.1 1187.0  1923.5 
1/ Scenario Full Liberalization A = exogenous price changes to agricultural outputs, inputs and consumption goods. 
 
Table 5: Household production and marketed surplus with Full Liberalization scenario B
1/ 
(% change) 
Link outside province:  No link   Link   Village 
Owning draught power:  No  Yes    No Yes     
Production:            
Crops  One season rice  -1.4  -0.3  1.2  37.2  17.3 
 Two season rice  0.3  0.2  -0.4  -16.2  -7.7 
  Other crops  -0.1  -0.1 -0.3  -0.1  -0.1 
Livestock  Pig production  1.0  1.9  1.3  -1.6  0.5 
 Other livestock  -15.4  -47.0  -9.4  52.4  4.0 
          
Marketed surplus:         
Crops  One season rice  -3.7  -0.6  2.4  54.6  27.9 
 Two season rice  -0.3  -0.1  -1.2  -47.9  -22.1 
  Other crops  -17.6  -1.8  -1.1  -0.8  -1.3 
Livestock  Pig production  1.0  2.2  1.4  -2.5  0.6 
 Other livestock  -34.7  -100.0  -34.4 169.9  11.6 
1) Scenario Full Liberalization B = exogenous increase in off-farm employment. 
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Table 6: Household production and marketed surplus with Full Liberalization scenario 
1/  
(% change) 
Link outside province:  No link   Link  
Owning draught power:  No  Yes    No Yes   
Village 
average 
Production:            
Crops  One season rice  -22.8  90.7 -42.0  -45.0 -20.4 
 Two season rice  9.7  -32.1  21.5  23.0  12.3 
  Other crops  -1.2  -2.1  -0.2  -1.5  -1.1 
Livestock  Pig production  -30.5  -83.7 -4.2  -22.8  -21.8 
 Other livestock  419.8  3088.5  48.0  360.3  642.0 
          
Marketed surplus:         
Crops  One season rice  -48.5  125.9 -81.6  -67.5  -34.1 
 Two season rice  21.2  -100.0  62.0  61.9  30.5 
  Other crops  -91.3  -40.1 -0.6  -23.8  -17.7 
Livestock  Pig production  -32.3  -100.0  -4.7  -36.2  -26.7 
 Other livestock  918.6  6528.3  175.9 1162.1  1898.9 
1/ Scenario Full Liberalization = exogenous changes in prices (A) and exogenous increase in off-farm employment (B). 
Note: (i) indicates an identical impact of price and employment components of full trade liberalization; (p) indicates that the 
price component of full trade liberalization dominates household response; (e) indicates that the employment component of 
full trade liberalization dominates household response. 
 
 
Table 7: Equivalent variation per adult equivalent by household group (yuan) and as 
percentage of base adult equivalent income 
Link outside province: No link  Link  Village average
Owning draught power: No  Yes  No Yes   
Full trade liberalization            
Prices  378 752   199 601   465 
  17% 33%  7% 22%   17% 
Employment  59 29   123 47   71 
  3% 1%  4% 2%   3% 
Prices and employment  441 806   321 702   563 
  20% 35%  11% 26%   21% 
Doha      
Prices  80 166   42 105   90 
  4% 7%  1% 4%   3% 
Employment  33 16   90 34   50 
  1% 1%  3% 1%   2% 
Prices and employment  121 168   131 133   136 
  5% 7%  4% 5%   5% 
Note: a yuan is about 0.25 dollar cents; adult equivalents are corrected for the absence of migrants  37
Table 8: Contribution of price changes and employment to income gains 
Link outside province: No link  Link  Village 
average 
       
Owning draught power: No  Yes  No Yes   
Full trade liberalization        
Prices  86% 93% 62% 86% 83% 
Employment  13% 4% 38% 7% 13% 
Interaction effects  1% 3% 0% 8% 5% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
   
Doha   
Prices  66% 99% 32% 79% 66% 
Employment  27% 10% 69% 26% 37% 
Interaction effects  7% -8% -1% -5% -3% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 